This paper investigates the interaction between product market competition and managers' decision to distribute cash to shareholders. Using a large sample of manufacturing firms, we find that firms in less competitive industries have significantly lower payout ratios than firms in more competitive markets. Further, we find that this negative relation between industry concentration levels and corporate payouts is much stronger among those firms whose overall characteristics make them (a) more likely to have high agency costs of free cash flows and (b) less likely to be the target of predation. In general, our results are consistent with the notion that the disciplinary forces of competition induce managers to payout excess cash and with the idea that corporate payouts are the "outcome" of external factors which induce managers to dispense excess cash. We do not find evidence of substitution between product market competition (the external disciplinary device) and the payout policy (internal disciplinary device); nor do we find evidence consistent with dividends being used to reduce adverse selection costs.
Introduction
It has been argued in the economic literature that intense product market competition provides corporate managers with incentives to behave efficiently (e.g., Allen and Gale, 2000) .
One of the main rationales for this argument is that the disciplinary forces of competition rapidly remove incompetent managers from the market. This is an old idea that was even recognized by Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations, who wrote that "monopoly…is a great enemy to good management." Other examples include Hicks (1935) , who acknowledges that "the best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life, " and Caves (1980) , who comments that economists seem to have a "vague suspicion that competition is the enemy of sloth." Over the past few decades, several theoretical papers have tried to formalize this idea by examining the potential channels through which competition can have an effect on managerial incentives (see, for example, Holmstrom (1982) , Hart (1983) , Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) , Scharfstein (1988) , Hermalin (1992) , Schmidt (1997) , Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1999) , Jagannathan and Srinivasan (1999) and Raith (2003) ). More recently, Allen and Gale (2000) conclude that competition among firms may be a more effective corporate governance mechanism than either the market for corporate control or monitoring by institutions.
From an empirical perspective, several recent studies seem to support this idea that competition incentivizes managers to be more efficient and more aligned with shareholders. For example, Graham, Kaplan, and Sibley (1983) find that airlines experienced significant productivity improvements after the deregulation of their industry in 1978. Nickell (1996) documents that total factor productivity growth among a sample of U.K. firms is positively correlated with proxies for competition intensity. Berger and Hannan (1998) find a strong negative relation between cost efficiency and measures of market power in the U.S. banking industry. Griffith (2001) provides evidence that an increase in product market competition leads to increases in productivity, especially among those firms in which managers are less aligned with shareholders. Guadalupe and Pérez-González (2005) find evidence that the private benefits of managerial control, a measure of the magnitude of the conflict between managers and shareholders, decrease with the intensity of product market competition. Grinstein and Palvia (2006) report that bank managers in less competitive markets are more likely to expropriate additional rents from shareholders through executive loans.
In this paper, we investigate whether this link between product market competition and managerial incentives has any implications for corporate payout policy. There are several potential reasons why product market competition and payout policy might be related. Perhaps the most important is the interaction between competition and agency conflicts. For example, it has been established in the literature that agency considerations play a significant role in payout decisions (see, for example, Lie (2000) , Grullon and Michaely (2004) , and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) ). Thus, it is possible that product market competition, through its effect on agency conflicts, may be an important determinant of the decision to pay out excess cash to shareholders Similar to La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) (henceforth LLSV), we argue that product market competition can potentially have two opposing effects on payout policies. One possibility is that firms pay dividends because competition exerts pressure on managers to distribute cash to their shareholders by increasing the risk and the cost of overinvesting (e.g., higher probability of liquidation, greater transparency). The main idea here is that intense competition can affect corporate payouts in similar ways as a strong legal system by creating conditions that pressure managers to pay out rather than invest in non-profitable investments (the "outcome" model). Alternatively, payout policy can be a substitute for competition: managers use dividends as a substitute for the external disciplinary factors to establish a good reputation in the capital markets to be able to raise capital on better terms ("substitution" model).
Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) from the Census of Manufacturers as a proxy for product market competition, we find that firms in more concentrated industries have significantly lower payout ratios than firms in less concentrated industries. These results hold even after controlling for other factors that have been documented to affect corporate payout policy, such as size, profitability, growth opportunities, firm age, leverage, and volatility.
Moreover, we find that the effect of concentration levels on corporate payouts is not only statistically significant, but also economically significant.
Although these results support the predictions of the "outcome" model, it is possible that firms in more concentrated markets pay lower dividends because they need to hoard cash to fend off predatory behavior from competitors, as in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) . To disentangle these two potential explanations (predation and agency), we investigate the effect of being the dominant firm in a particular industry on the relation between product market competition and payout ratios. According to the predation hypothesis, the dominant firm should be less concerned about inducing predatory behavior than non-dominant firms because it has more resources and potentially more market power to fend any predatory attack. Therefore, dominant firms should be less concerned about paying out cash. As a consequence, if the predation hypothesis is true, then the negative relation between industry concentration levels and payout ratios should be weaker among dominant firms and stronger among non-dominant firms.
In contrast, the outcome agency model predicts that the negative relation between concentration and payouts should be stronger among dominant firms. The reason for this is that dominant firms have characteristics that make them likely candidates to have high agency costs of free cash flows: they tend to be large mature firms with low investment opportunities that generate substantial and stable cash flows. Thus, if competition reduces agency costs by forcing managers to pay out excess cash rather than invest in non-profitable investments, then we should find that the effect of competition on corporate payouts should be stronger among this type of firms.
Our empirical findings indicate that the negative relation between industry concentration levels and corporate payouts is much stronger among dominant firms. That is, among those firms that are more likely to have high agency costs of free cash flows, the ones that face less pressure from the product market distribute less cash to their shareholders, consistent with the implications of the outcome model. This result is even more surprising because dominant firms in less competitive markets are larger, older, and have more stable earnings than dominant firms in more competitive markets. Further supporting the predictions of agency theory, we find evidence that dominant firms in concentrated markets tend to invest inefficiently. Overall, these are important results because they suggest that the link between product market competition and corporate payout policy documented in this paper is primarily driven by agency considerations, and not by predation risk.
There are significant disagreements in the literature on what the interaction of payout policies and corporate governance is. Using data from several countries with different levels of investor protection, LLSV (2000) test the implications of the outcome and substitution hypotheses. Consistent with the empirical predictions of the "outcome" model, they find that firms in countries with strong minority shareholder rights tend to pay higher dividends. More recently, Michaely and Roberts (2006) examine dividend policies of private firms with dispersed ownership and low investor protections (e.g., no market for corporate control) to dividend policies of public firms, which have better corporate governance mechanisms such as market for corporate control, more public monitoring and tighter reporting. They find that public firms pay higher dividends and that their dividends are more sensitive to investment opportunities relative to private firms, consistent with the outcome hypothesis.
However, several recent papers argue that firms use dividend payments to reduce agency costs that are caused by poor governance, and that dividends are used as a substitute for good corporate governance. Officer (2006) Overall, our results complement and extend existing evidence by looking at a novel and perhaps more precise measure of corporate governance (Allen and Gale, 2000) . The higher payouts in more competitive industries suggest that intense product market competition appears to have induced management to disgorge cash. These findings are important for several reasons. First, they lend further support the idea that corporate payouts are the outcome of external disciplinary forces. Second, they underscore the importance of agency conflicts in the determination of corporate payout policy. Finally, they provide another example of how product market competition can have a significant effect on corporate financial decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical arguments linking corporate payout policy to product market competition. Section 3 describes the sample selection procedure, defines the variables, and provides summary statistics. Section 4 investigates the empirical relation between industry concentration levels and corporate payout policy. In Sections 5 and 6, we investigate whether agency theory can explain the relation between product market competition and corporate payout policy documented in this paper. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The Link between Corporate Payout Policy and Product Market Competition
In this section, we discuss several potential channels through which product market competition can affect managers' decision to distribute cash to their shareholders. Building on the work of LLSV, we explain how corporate payouts could be the outcome of intense product market competition or, alternatively, a substitute for competition. Further, we explain how potential predatory behavior in less competitive markets can affect corporate payout policy.
Outcome Model
The outcome model argues that managers need some inducements to dispense free cash flows. This inducement can be stricter laws (LLSV, 2000) , tighter regulation and corporate control (Michaely and Roberts, 2007) or competition. Managers in highly competitive markets distribute more cash to their shareholders because they are more likely to be penalized by the disciplinary forces of competition if they mishandle the resources of the firm. This idea is based on the assumption that competition increases the risk and the costs of overinvesting for managers. Theoretically, there are two main arguments that seem to justify this assumption.
The first argument is related to the threat-of-liquidation hypothesis (see, for example, Schmidt (1997) and Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1999) ). The main rationale here is that if a firm in a highly competitive industry starts investing in negative NPV projects, then it would become less competitive (e.g., raising prices to subsidize the bad projects), and consequently, more likely to be driven out of the market. Thus, to avoid liquidation, loss of bonuses that are related to stock price performance, or the loss of their jobs, managers in more competitive markets will tend to avoid negative NPV projects, thus making dividends and share repurchases more appealing to them.
The second argument for the outcome model is related to the yardstick competition hypothesis (see, for example, Holmstrom (1982) , Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Shleifer (1985) ). Under this hypothesis, product market competition reduces asymmetric information and monitoring costs by generating greater opportunities for outsiders to benchmark the performance of a firm to the performance of its competitors. Therefore, according to this argument, intense competition could make overinvestment riskier and more costly for management by increasing the likelihood that outsiders will identify and replace those managers who are destroying value.
Interestingly, recent empirical studies seem to support this idea. For example, DeFond and Park (1999) and Fee and Hadlock (2000) find that CEO turnover is higher in more competitive industries. Further, Kruse and Rennie (2006) finds that poorly performing firms operating in highly competitive markets are more likely to become a takeover target. 1 Empirically, the "outcome" model has two major implications. First, it predicts a negative relation between industry concentration levels and corporate payouts. Second, it predicts that this negative relation between concentration levels and payouts should be stronger among firms with severe agency problems of free cash flows. The main rationale for the latter prediction is that if competition affects corporate payout policy by increasing the risk and the 1 It is also possible that the market for corporate control is more effective in competitive markets than in noncompetitive markets because anti-trust legislations make acquisitions more difficult in non-competitive markets. cost of overinvesting, then its effect on payouts should be stronger among those firms that are more likely to overinvest. We empirically test this implication by examining whether the relation between concentration levels and corporate payouts is stronger among low-growth large mature firms that generate substantial and stable cash flows.
Substitution Model
Under the "substitution" model dividends are substitute to other disciplinary measures such as laws and regulations (LLSV, 2000) , compliance and regulations of public markets (Michaely and Roberts, 2007) , or the disciplinary role of market competition. Additionally, payout may be used more commonly in less competitive markets (i.e. markets with less information) because of reputation and signaling. Thus managers in less competitive markets pay dividends and repurchase shares to mitigate the potential agency costs generated by the lack of competitive pressure from the product market. According to recent theoretical arguments, managers of under-valued firms may rationally do this to establish a reputation for treating shareholders well so they can raise capital at favorable terms in the future (LLSV, 2000) and to maximize the value of their holdings in the firm (Gomes (2000)).
Our version of the "substitution" model is based on the premise that firms in less competitive markets face higher agency costs associated with free cash flows. One potential reason for this is that these firms have the ability to generate extraordinary rents, which allows managers to have access to more free cash flows (see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ). Another potential reason is that managers in less competitive markets are more likely to overinvest because they are less susceptible to the disciplinary forces of product market competition. For example, since value-destroying managers in less competitive markets have more slack to subsidize negative NPV projects, they are more likely to avoid liquidation than similar managers in more competitive industries. Firms in less competitive industries are also likely to be subject to greater information asymmetry. So for example, bad managers in more concentrated industries are less likely to be identified and replaced by outsiders because there are fewer opportunities to benchmark their performance. The substitution hypothesis also suggest that the higher information asymmetry results in a larger role for reputation and signaling considerations in payout decisions.
In terms of empirical implications, the "substitution" model predicts that corporate payouts should be positively correlated with industry concentration levels because managers use dividends and share repurchases as a substitute for intense competition. However, this model does not provide clear predictions on how the magnitude of potential agency problems should affect the positive relation between concentration levels and corporate payouts. On the one hand, if managers use corporate payouts to establish a reputation as good managers to raise capital on better terms in the future (LLSV), then the positive relation between concentration levels and payouts should be stronger among high-growth firms that generate low cash flows because these are the firms that are most likely to access the capital markets in the future. On the other hand, if managers use corporate payouts to mitigate the agency costs of free cash flows so they can maximize the value of their holdings in the firm (Gomes (2000)), then we should expect a stronger positive correlation between concentration levels and payouts among firms with severe agency costs of free cash flows. The main rationale for this is that the benefits of reducing potential agency problems are larger among this type of firms.
Predation Hypothesis
It is also possible that product market competition and payout policy may interact for strategic consideration such as predation risk. For example, an implication of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) is that firms will tend to hoard cash so that they are better able to fend off potential predatory behavior.
2 Since this behavior is unlikely to be effective in competitive markets not only because prices are equal to marginal costs, but also because there is no gain from having n-1 firms instead of n firms in the market, predatory risk is higher in less competitive markets. Thus, the major prediction of the predation hypothesis is that payouts should be lower in more concentrated industries.
Note that the predation hypothesis and the "outcome" model generate similar predictions regarding the relation between product market competition and corporate payouts. However, we try to distinguish these two explanations by examining the effect of being the dominant firm in an industry on the relation between competition and corporate payouts. As discussed above, the predation hypothesis predicts that the negative relation between concentration levels and payouts should be stronger among the non-dominant firms in an industry. This follows from the idea that predation is less likely to occur against dominant firms because these firms have more resources to fend any predatory attack and they are less likely to pass profitable investment opportunities due to financial constraints (see, for example, Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2006)).
Sample Selection, Variable Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics

Sample Selection
Our initial sample consists of all the firms operating in any of the industries covered by the Census of Manufacturers (SIC code interval 2000-3990). This census reports the results from a survey held every five years in which all manufacturing firms in the U.S. are asked to provide information on their number of employees, payroll, and total output. Unlike most surveys, this is a fully comprehensive sample since firms are required by federal law to respond to the survey supplied by the U.S. Census (Title 13 of the U.S. Code). Thus, selection bias is not an issue. Using this information, the U.S. Census calculates several summary statistics, including the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) that we use in this paper.
Since the HHIs are only reported every five years, we assume that the indexes stay constant until the results from a new survey are available. For example, we use the HHIs reported in 1987 for the observations in years 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991 . This approach is unlikely to bias our empirical results because the HHI does not experience large changes over time. For example, the probability that an industry in the smallest HHI quintile moves to the largest HHI quintile (or vice versa) over a period of 5 years is virtually zero.
From our initial sample of manufacturing firms, we then select those observations that satisfy the following criteria: (1) the firm appears on the CRSP/Compustat merged files, and (2) the firm has available information on both dividends and share repurchases. This selection process generates a final sample of 65,835 firm-year observations and 3,512 firms over the period 1972 to 2006. This is a relatively large sample considering that it only contains manufacturing firms. As pointed out by several authors, the concentration measures reported by the Census of Manufacturers are more meaningful than the ones derived from Compustat data because the former measures are constructed using both private and public firms while the latter measures only use public firms. In a recent empirical study, Ali, Klasa, and Yeung (2006) show that this key difference between these two measures seems to significantly bias the HHI derived from
Variable Definitions
Proxy for Industry Concentration
Compustat data. For example, consistent with the idea that in more concentrated markets there should be fewer and larger firms, Ali et. al. (2006) find that the HHI reported in the Census of
Manufacturers is negatively correlated with the total number of firms in the industry and positively correlated with average firm size. However, they do not find these results when they use the HHI derived from Compustat data. Surprisingly, they find that industries classified as concentrated using the Compustat HHI tend to be populated by smaller firms. These findings are important because they raise serious concern about the use of Compustat concentration measures as proxy for industry concentration. This is the main reason why we perform our empirical tests using the HHI from the Census of Manufacturers.
Measures of Corporate Payouts
Using data from Compustat, we construct the following six measures of corporate payouts: dividends and total payouts scaled by total sales (item 12), dividends and total payouts scaled by total assets (item 6), and dividends and total payouts scaled by the market value of equity (item 24 times item 199). Dividends (DIV) are equal to the total dollar amount of dividends declared on the common stock of a company during a year (item 21). Total payouts (TPAY) are defined as dividends plus share repurchases (item 115). We construct measures of total payouts because there is evidence that share repurchases have become an important payout method for many firms (see, for example, Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Boudoukh et al (2007) ). Finally, to mitigate the effect of outliers, we exclude from our analyses all observations where the payout ratios are greater than one.
Control Variables
Following the literature on corporate payout policy, we control for the following firm characteristics in our empirical analyses:
• Maturity: Our proxies for the level of firm maturity are the market value of equity (MV) and the age of the firm (AGE). MV is defined as the total number of common shares outstanding (Compustat item 25) times the closing stock price at the end of the fiscal year (item 199). AGE is the time (in years) from the firm's CRSP listing date.
• Investment Opportunities: We use the market-to-book ratio (M/B) and the sales growth rate (GS_5YR) as proxies for investment opportunities. M/B is equal to the book value of assets (item 6) plus the market value of equity (MV) minus the book value of equity (item 60) scaled by the book value of assets. GS_5YR is the five-year growth rate in total sales (item 12).
• Risk: Our proxy for risk is the volatility of stock returns (RETVOL). RETVOL is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over a one-year period.
• Profitability: We use the return on assets (ROA) as a proxy for the level of profitability of the firm. ROA is the operating income before depreciation (item 13)
scaled by the book value of assets.
• Leverage: We define leverage (DEBT/ASSETS) as long-term debt (item 9) plus short-term debt (item 44) scaled by the book value of assets.
To mitigate the effect of outliers, M/B, ROA, and GS_5YR are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% of their empirical distribution. Further, since there is evidence that corporate payout policy in the U.S. has significantly changed over the last three decades (see, for example, Fama and French (2001) and Grullon and Michaely (2002)), we also include year dummies in our regressions to control for any time trends. Finally, we include two-digit SIC code dummies to control for industry effects.
Given the well documented fact that large, stable, profitable, old firms with low investment opportunities are more likely to distribute cash to their shareholders than are other types of firms, we expect the coefficients of MV, AGE, and ROA to have a positive sign, and the coefficients of M/B, GS_5YR, and RETVOL to have a negative sign. However, the coefficient of DEBT/ASSETS could be positive or negative depending on whether firms treat leverage as a substitute for payouts or as a complement to payouts. Table 1 reports summary statistics for the firms in our sample. This table shows that the average sample firm has a dividend yield (DIV/MV) equal to 1.17% and a total payout ratio (TPAY/MV) equal to 2.24%. These payout ratios are very similar to the ones reported in Grullon and Michaely (2002) . Further, the average firm in our sample is almost 11 years old and it has a market value of equity (MV) of $1.6 billion, a market-to-book ratio (M/B) equal to 2.0, a debt-to-asset ratio (DEBT/ASSETS) equal to 18%, and the median return on assets (ROA) is 11% (the mean ROA is 0%). Interestingly, the characteristics of the average firm in our sample are very similar to the characteristics of the average firm in Compustat (not reported in a table).
Descriptive Statistics
Thus, it seems that our sample is not biased toward a particular type of firm. Finally, Table 1 also shows that that there are large cross-sectional differences in payout ratios and firm characteristics. This large dispersion in both dependent and independent variables should improve the power of our empirical tests to detect any effect of concentration levels on corporate payouts.
The Relation Between Industry Concentration Levels and Corporate Payout Policy
In this section, we investigate whether product market competition affects manager's decision to distribute cash to their shareholders. We perform this analysis by regressing scaled measures of dividends and total payouts on the HHI, size (MV), market-to-book ratio (M/B), return on assets (ROA), debt-to-total assets ratio (DEBT/ASSETS) , age of the firm (AGE), fiveyear growth rate in total sales (GS_5YR), stock return volatility (RETVOL), year dummies, and industry dummies.
Since our measures of corporate payouts are truncated at zero and one, we estimate the regression coefficients using a two-sided Tobit model. Following Petersen (2006), we control for possible cross-sectional dependence in the residuals by adjusting the standard errors for within-firm correlation, and control for any time series dependence by including time dummies.
We do not include firm-fixed effects in our panel data regressions because the HHIs do not change much over time. However, we include two-digit SIC code dummies to control for industry-fixed effects. Table 2 shows estimates of regressions relating scaled dividends to the HHI and other control variables. Consistent with the predictions of the "outcome" model and the predation risk hypothesis, Table 2 shows that dividend payout ratios are negatively correlated with industry concentration levels even after controlling for firm characteristics and time trends. Note that the coefficient of the HHI is negative. Table 2 also shows that the difference in average dividend payouts between firms in the highest HHI quintile and the firms in the lowest HHI quintile (see the coefficient of HHI(Q5)-HHI(Q1)) is negative and statistically significant in all the specifications.
As expected, Table 2 shows that dividend payout ratios are positively correlated with MV, AGE, and ROA, and negatively correlated with M/B, GS_5YR, and RETVOL. Moreover, there is evidence that dividends are negatively related to leverage (DEBT/ASSET). In general, these results are consistent with the stylized fact that large, stable, profitable, old firms with low investment opportunities pay more dividends.
Since there is empirical evidence that firms have been substituting share repurchases for dividends (see, for example, Grullon and Michaely (2002)), it is possible that the results in Table   2 may be biased because dividends may not be a good measure of corporate payouts. Thus, we replicate in Table 3 the previous analyses using total payouts (dividends plus share repurchases) instead of dividends. Similar to the findings using dividends, this table shows that total payouts ratios are negatively correlated with the HHI. Overall, the empirical results in this section indicate that firms in more competitive market tend to have higher payout ratios than firms in less competitive market.
One caveat about the analysis performed in this section is that we assume that the effect of concentration levels on dividend payouts is the same across all types of firms. As we discuss in Section 5, this is a very restrictive assumption because both the "outcome" model and the prediction risk hypothesis predict that the effect of the HHI on corporate payouts should be different between dominant and non-dominant firms. Thus, the coefficients of the HHI estimated in this section are likely to be biased. We address this issue in the next section.
The Effect of Being the Dominant Firm in an Industry on the Relation between Industry Concentration Levels and Corporate Payout Policy
The results in the previous section suggest that corporate payouts are the outcome of the disciplinary forces of product market competition. However, it is possible that firms in more concentrated markets tend to hoard cash (e.g., pay less dividends) to fend off predatory behavior from competitors. To distinguish between these two explanations, we examine the effect of being the dominant firm in an industry on the relation between product market competition and corporate payout policy.
As discussed earlier, the predation risk hypothesis predicts that the negative relation between the HHI and payout ratios should be weaker among dominant firms and stronger among non-dominant firms. The main intuition behind this argument is that dominant firms in a particular industry should be less concerned about inducing predatory behavior than nondominant firms because the former firms have more resources and potentially more market power to fend any predatory attack.
If corporate payouts are the "outcome" of intense product market competition, however, then we should expect that the effect of competition on payouts should be stronger among those firms that are more likely to have high agency cost of free cash flows. Thus, since dominant firms tend to be large mature firms with low investment opportunities that generate substantial and stable cash flows (as we show below), the "outcome" model predicts that the negative relation between the HHI and payouts should be stronger among this type of firms.
We begin this analysis by classifying as dominant firms those firms that have the largest market value of equity at time t in a four-digit SIC industry. To examine whether the firms classified as dominant firms are the clear leaders in their particular industries, we report the characteristic of dominant and non-dominant firms in Table 4 . This table shows that the average dominant firm is an order of magnitude larger than the average non-dominant firm. For example, the average market value of equity of dominant firms is almost 7 times larger than the average market value of equity of non-dominant firms. Further, note that dominant firms tend to be much older, more profitable, less volatile, and have fewer growth options than non-dominant firms.
The results in Table 4 are important because they suggest that non-dominant firms are significantly less likely to survive a predatory attack than dominant firms. Thus, if predation risk is the main reason why firms in more concentrated markets have lower payout ratios, then the relation between the HHI and payouts should be stronger among non-dominant firms. The results in Table 4 are also important because they show that dominant firms are exactly the type of firms that Jensen (1986) considers as the most likely to have high agency cost of free cash flows. 3 Therefore, if the "outcome" model is true, the negative relation between the HHI and payouts documented in the previous section should be stronger among dominant firms. Clearly, by examining the effect of being the dominant firm on the relation between concentration levels and corporate payouts, one could simultaneously test the predictions of the "outcome" model and the predation risk hypothesis.
To investigate whether the relation between the HHI and payout ratios is different between dominant and non-dominant firms, we include in our regressions an interaction term that is equal to the HHI if the firm is a dominant firm, zero otherwise. If the predation risk hypothesis is correct, then the coefficient of the interaction term should be positive. However, if agency considerations are the main drivers behind the relation between concentration levels and corporate payouts, then the coefficient of the interaction term should be negative. Table 5 reports the results from this alternative specification. Consistent with the predictions of the "outcome" model, this table shows that the coefficient of the interaction term (HHI x DOMINANT) is negative and statistically significant in all the specifications. This result implies that the negative relation between the HHI and dividend payout ratios is much stronger among dominant firms. Note that the effect of the HHI on dividend payout ratios for dominant firms is much larger than the one for non-dominant firms. Interestingly, there is evidence that the relation between concentration levels and dividend payout ratios is completely driven by the dominant firms. For example, the difference in average dividend payouts between firms in the highest HHI quintile and the firms in the lowest HHI quintile is only statistically significant among dominant firms. Table 6 reports similar empirical results using total payout ratios instead of dividend payout ratios.
In general, the empirical results in this section indicate that the negative relation between HHI and corporate payouts is mainly driven by firms that are likely to have high agency cost of free cash flows. These findings seem to support the idea that corporate payouts are the "outcome" of external factors. However, they are inconsistent with the idea that firms in more concentrated markets tend to pay less cash to fend off predatory behavior from competitors.
Are Dominant Firms in Less Competitive Markets Behaving Inefficiently?
In the previous section we document that the effect of product market competition on corporate payouts is stronger among dominant firms. We interpret these results as evidence that product market competition helps to mitigate the potential agency problems of free cash flows.
However, if it is true that agency issues are driving our results, then we should find some evidence that dominant firms in less competitive markets are less efficient than dominant firms in competitive markets. The main purpose of this section is to investigate this important issue.
We begin our analysis by examining whether dominant firms in less competitive markets invest more than they should given their level of investment opportunities. To investigate this issue, we report in Table 7 the differences in average firm characteristics between dominant firms in competitive markets (lowest HHI quintile) and dominant firms in non-competitive markets (highest HHI quintile). Consistent with idea that dominant firms in less competitive markets are overinvesting, this table shows that these firms have much higher capital expenditure ratios (CAPEX/ASSETS) than dominant firms in competitive industries despite the fact that both types of firms have the same investment opportunities as proxied by the market-to-book ratio (M/B) and the five-year growth rate in total sales (GS_5YR). In an regression analysis not reported in a table, we also find that dominant firms in non-competitive industries tend to invest more even after controlling for proxies for investment opportunities.
Although the results seem to suggest that dominant firms in less competitive markets are investing more than they should given their investment opportunities, it is still unclear whether these firms are behaving inefficiently. To answer this question, we examine the effect the effect of being the dominant firm on the relation between the product market competition and efficiency. Specifically, we investigate whether dominant firms in non-competitive markets are less efficient than dominant firms in competitive markets. Following the methodology in Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000), we use sales scaled by assets (asset turnover) and selling, general, and administrative expenses scaled by sales (expense ratio) as proxy for firm efficiency. If dominant firms in less competitive industries are allocating their resources inefficiently, then these firms should have a lower asset turnover and a higher expense ratio. Note that the HHI is negatively correlated with asset turnover (see column 1) and positively correlated with the expense ratio (see column 3). But more importantly, Table 8 also shows that the negative correlation between the HHI and asset turnover and the positive correlation between the HHI and the expense ratio is much stronger among dominant firms (see columns 2 and 4).
That is, dominant firms in non-competitive markets tend to be less efficient than dominant firms in competitive markets. These empirical results are important because they further confirm our previous results that agency issues drive the negative relation between concentration levels and corporate payouts.
Conclusion
Our study extends the work of LLSV by arguing that product market competition can be viewed as an additional external disciplinary factor. Based on the idea that competition can exert pressure on managers to distribute cash to their shareholders by increasing the risk and the cost of overinvesting, we argue that corporate payouts could be the result of product market competition or, alternatively, a substitute for competition.
The results in this paper seem to support the idea that corporate payouts are the outcome of the disciplinary forces of product market competition. We find that corporate payouts are negatively correlated with the industry concentration levels even after controlling for potential confounding effects. Moreover, consistent with the implications of agency theory, we find that the effect of product market competition on payouts is stronger among those firms that are more likely to have high agency costs of free cash flows.
Overall, our results complement the empirical results in LLSV. While they find evidence suggesting that a strong legal system exerts pressure on corporate managers to distribute excess cash to their shareholders, we find that intense product market competition appears to have similar effects. These findings are important because they further suggest that agency problems play an important role on managers' decision to distribute cash to shareholders.
Table 1 Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics for the sample firms. To be included in the sample, the observation must satisfy the following criteria: the firm's financial data is available on Compustat; the firm operates in an industry covered by the Census of Manufacturers (SIC code interval 2000-3990) ; the firm has available information on dividends and share repurchases. DIV is the total dollar amount of dividends declared on the common stock. REPO is the expenditure on the purchase of common and preferred stocks. TPAY is the total payout of the firm (DIV plus REPO). SALES are total sales. MV is the market value of common stock. ASSETS are equal to the total book value of assets. AGE is the time (in years) from the firm's CRSP listing date. M/B is the market-to-book ratio [(book value of assets + market value of equity -book value of equity) / book value of assets]. DEBT/ASSETS is equal to long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled by total assets. HHI is the four-digit SIC Herfindahl-Hirschman Index from the Census of Manufacturers. ROA is the operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets. GS_5YR is the five-year growth rate in total sales. RETVOL is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns. CAPEX is the level of capital expenditures. All the payout measures have been truncated at one. M/B, ROA, and GS_5YR have been winsorized at the 1% and the 99% of the empirical distribution. 
Table 2 The Relation between Product Market Competition and Dividend Payouts
This table reports estimates of regressions relating scaled dividends to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and other control variables. DIV is the total dollar amount of dividends declared on the common stock. SALES are total sales. MV is the market value of common stock. ASSETS are equal to the total book value of assets. HHI is the four-digit SIC Herfindahl-Hirschman Index from the Census of Manufacturers scaled by 10,000. HHI(Q5) -HHI(Q1) is equal to the difference in average dividend payouts between firms in the highest HHI quintile (Q5) and firms in the lowest HHI quintile (Q1). M/B is the market-to-book ratio [(book value of assets + market value of equity -book value of equity) / book value of assets]. ROA is the operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets. DEBT/ASSETS is equal to long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled by total assets. AGE is the time (in years) from the firm's CRSP listing date. GS_5YR is the five-year growth rate in total sales. RETVOL is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns. All the payout measures have been truncated at one. M/B, ROA, and GS_5YR have been winsorized at the 1% and the 99% of the empirical distribution. Since the dependent variables are truncated at zero and one, we estimate the regression coefficients using a two-sided Tobit model. Standard errors adjusted for within-firm correlation are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Superscripts a, b, and c denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table reports estimates of regressions relating scaled total payouts to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and other control variables. TPAY is the total payout of the firm [the total dollar amount of dividends declared on the common stock plus the expenditure on the purchase of common and preferred stocks]. SALES are total sales. MV is the market value of common stock. ASSETS are equal to the total book value of assets. HHI is the four-digit SIC Herfindahl-Hirschman Index from the Census of Manufacturers scaled by 10,000. HHI(Q5) -HHI(Q1) is equal to the difference in average dividend payouts between firms in the highest HHI quintile (Q5) and firms in the lowest HHI quintile (Q1). M/B is the market-to-book ratio [(book value of assets + market value of equity -book value of equity) / book value of assets]. ROA is the operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets. DEBT/ASSETS is equal to long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled by total assets. AGE is the time (in years) from the firm's CRSP listing date. GS_5YR is the five-year growth rate in total sales. RETVOL is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns. All the payout measures have been truncated at one. M/B, ROA, and GS_5YR have been winsorized at the 1% and the 99% of the empirical distribution. Since the dependent variables are truncated at zero and one, we estimate the regression coefficients using a two-sided Tobit model. Standard errors adjusted for within-firm correlation are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Superscripts a, b, and c denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table presents a comparison of average firm characteristics for dominant and non-dominant firms. A dominant firm is defined as the firm with the largest market value of equity in a four-digit SIC industry. MV is the market value of common stock. ASSETS are equal to the total book value of assets. AGE is the time (in years) from the firm's CRSP listing date. M/B is the market-to-book ratio [(book value of assets + market value of equity -book value of equity) / book value of assets]. DEBT/ASSETS is equal to long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled by total assets. ROA is the operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets. GS_5YR is the five-year growth rate in total sales. RETVOL is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns. M/B, ROA, and GS_5YR have been winsorized at the 1% and the 99% of the empirical distribution. Superscripts a, b, and c denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table examines the effect of being the dominant firm on the relation between the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and dividend payout ratios. DIV is the total dollar amount of dividends declared on the common stock. SALES are total sales. MV is the market value of common stock. ASSETS are equal to the total book value of assets. HHI is the four-digit SIC Herfindahl-Hirschman Index from the Census of Manufacturers scaled by 10,000. HHI(Q5) -HHI(Q1) is equal to the difference in average dividend payouts between firms in the highest HHI quintile (Q5) and firms in the lowest HHI quintile (Q1). DOMINANT is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has the largest market value of equity at time t in a four-digit SIC industry, zero otherwise. M/B is the market-to-book ratio [(book value of assets + market value of equity -book value of equity) / book value of assets]. ROA is the operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets. DEBT/ASSETS is equal to long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled by total assets. AGE is the time (in years) from the firm's CRSP listing date. GS_5YR is the five-year growth rate in total sales. RETVOL is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns. All the payout measures have been truncated at one. M/B, ROA, and GS_5YR have been winsorized at the 1% and the 99% of the empirical distribution. Since the dependent variables are truncated at zero and one, we estimate the regression coefficients using a two-sided Tobit model. Standard errors adjusted for within-firm correlation are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Superscripts a, b, and c denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table examines the effect of being the dominant firm on the relation between the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and total payout ratios. TPAY is the total payout of the firm [the total dollar amount of dividends declared on the common stock plus the expenditure on the purchase of common and preferred stocks]. SALES are total sales. MV is the market value of common stock. ASSETS are equal to the total book value of assets. HHI is the four-digit SIC Herfindahl-Hirschman Index from the Census of Manufacturers scaled by 10,000. HHI(Q5) -HHI(Q1) is equal to the difference in average dividend payouts between firms in the highest HHI quintile (Q5) and firms in the lowest HHI quintile (Q1). DOMINANT is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has the largest market value of equity at time t in a four-digit SIC industry, zero otherwise. M/B is the market-to-book ratio [(book value of assets + market value of equity -book value of equity) / book value of assets]. ROA is the operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets. DEBT/ASSETS is equal to long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled by total assets. AGE is the time (in years) from the firm's CRSP listing date. GS_5YR is the five-year growth rate in total sales. RETVOL is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns. All the payout measures have been truncated at one. M/B, ROA, and GS_5YR have been winsorized at the 1% and the 99% of the empirical distribution. Since the dependent variables are truncated at zero and one, we estimate the regression coefficients using a two-sided Tobit model. Standard errors adjusted for within-firm correlation are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Superscripts a, b, and c denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table presents a comparison of average firm characteristics for dominant firms in competitive and noncompetitive markets. A dominant firm is defined as the firm with the largest market value of equity in a four-digit SIC industry. CAPEX is total capital expenditures. ASSETS are equal to the total book value of assets. AGE is the time (in years) from the firm's CRSP listing date. M/B is the market-to-book ratio [(book value of assets + market value of equity -book value of equity) / book value of assets]. DEBT/ASSETS is equal to long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled by total assets. ROA is the operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets. GS_5YR is the five-year growth rate in total sales. RETVOL is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns. M/B, ROA, and GS_5YR have been winsorized at the 1% and the 99% of the empirical distribution. Superscripts a, b, and c denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
